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Abstract:  The paper studies the policy response to the market failures and challenges of 
healthcare in transition. Bulgaria chose a halfway shift from healthcare services provided 
entirely by the state to a system with private providers of outpatient services and public 
providers of inpatient services, both sectors financed mainly by state-run compulsory 
payroll insurance system. The paper shows the evolution of this reform path to low 
compliance by both customers (contributors) and service-providers (contractors with the 
National Health Insurance Fund), which leads to excessive regulations and control, and 
crowding out of the private sector. The outcome is a system that is increasingly driven by 
administrative controls at the expense of market incentives. Based on this analysis it 
identifies the relevant policy implications and opportunities for moving the stalled health 
reforms out of the institutional impasse.  
 
JEL classification: H51; H83 
 
Здравната реформа в България: Опит за диагноза и предписание 
Изследвa се реформата в здравеопазването като отговор на пазарните 
несъвършенства и предизивикателства на предоставянето на здравни услуги. 
България предприе половинчат вариант на преход в здравеопазването, 
преминавайки от система на здравни услуги, предоставяни изцяло  от  държавата  
към  система на частни доставчици в доболничния сектор и публични доставчици в 
болничния сектор,  като и двата сектора са финансирани основно от 
задължителните вноски в държавната здравоосигурителната система. Изследването   
показва закономерната еволюцията  на  тази  система към отклоняване от 
добросъвестното спазване на законодателството както от страна на осигурители и 
осигурени, така и от страна на доставчиците  на  здравни услуги, което пък води до 
прекомерен административен контрол и регулации и изтласкването  на  частния 
сектор от тази сфера. В резултат качеството на услугите се определят главно от 
регулации и контрол вместо от избора на пациента пазарните стимули. Въз основа  
на  този анализ са направени изводи за необходимата политика и възможностите   
за   извеждане   на   здравната   реформа   от  нейния институционален застой. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The author is Senior Fellow at the Economic Program of the Center for the Study of Democracy. The 
views, expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessary reflect the views of the Center. 
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Executive summary 
 
Health care is among the few areas, where the benefits of Bulgaria’s transition to 
market economy are most uncertain. This is largely due to the fact that the growing 
number of people, which are most dependent on the public health care system - elderly 
people, unemployed, low income groups etc. – have most limited access to good quality 
services. In brief, the system lost much of its former advantages of state healthcare which 
lie mainly in the universal coverage and access, without gaining yet much of the 
advantages of a market-based provision of services, which is supposed to bring 
technology innovation, higher quality and customer satisfaction.  
 
Standard health indicators have deteriorated in the years of transition. Falling 
birth rate and rising mortality rate, combined with migrant outflow of young people – 
all that intensified the problem of ageing population and put additional pressure on the 
healthcare system of transition. High mortality rate is driven mainly by diseases of the 
circulatory system (heart attacks and brain strokes), which account for more than two 
thirds of all deaths. Cancer comes second, but with fast growing rates. The leading causes 
of hospitalization are diseases of the respiratory system, with pneumonia accounting for 
about half of the lethal outcomes in this group. Another alarming trend is the rising 
incidence of psychiatric diseases. As they are not among the leading mortality factors 
they remain outside the focus of health statistics and moreover are not always adequately 
diagnosed and cured in Bulgaria. Their social and economic costs however are much 
higher than implied by death statistics. 
 
Another important negative indicator of the overall health status is the growing 
disability rates. The number of disabled persons grew three times in the years of 
transition, the indicator of newly registered disability cases exceeding almost twice the 
EU average and is one of the highest in the world. Similar to the mortality factors, the 
leading cause of disability are the diseases of the circulatory system.  
 
An important synthetic indicator of the effectiveness of the health system is 
infant mortality rate. In the beginning of transition this indicator placed Bulgaria in a 
position similar to that of the countries of CEE and in even better position than Poland 
and Hungary. About 15 years later it is in the bottom of the list with only Romania and 
Albania having higher infant mortality rate on the Balkans. The probability of a child 
dying before the age of five is about three times higher in Bulgaria than in the EU-15 and 
about two times higher than in the new member states. The leading causes for the high 
infant mortality rates are premature births or complications in the prenatal period as well 
as pneumonia and various infections. The years of transition marked as well deterioration 
of some health indicators, which reflect problems typical for the low-income countries, 
such as incidence of tuberculosis and hepatitis. 
 
All above indicators are national averages and hide wide regional disparities 
and the gravity of the situation in certain areas. Mortality, including infant mortality, 
is much higher in rural areas and regions with ethnic minorities.  
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The worsening health status of Bulgarian population is partly due to negative 
demographic trends - declining birth and fertility rates, outflow of young migrant workers 
abroad, etc. Large part of it can be attributed however to worse coverage and access to 
healthcare services in the years of transition. The reasons are  not only in the economic 
and social shocks of transition but also in institutional failures. 
 
The major driver of deteriorated access to services is the drop in incomes and the 
increased economic vulnerability of a large part of the population combined with the 
transition to insurance-based system. Poverty and poor health status are correlated in a 
vicious circle, in which poverty leaves more people out of the coverage of health 
insurance, while poor health creates more unemployment and social exclusion. The 
health reform could not supply adequate solutions to these new challenges to the 
healthcare system. The state withdrew from provision of healthcare services, 
concentrating on the management of state insurance, while active prophylactics and 
prevention programs relied mainly on external financing thus responding to international 
priorities rather than to national health risks. Rising infant mortality and infectious 
diseases can be largely attributed to drop in immunization rates. The transition from state-
run to insurance-based healthcare system reduced prophylactic and healthcare coverage, 
especially for those who are not covered by health insurance.  
 
Apart from the problems of coverage and access for the fast expanding low-
income group, the transition to market economy brought some new or increased health 
risks for other income groups as well. The big bang liberalization of prices and 
entrepreneurship without the adequate legal environment to protect the rights of 
consumers and employees, led to an increase in the health risks at work and at home. The 
state had little capacity to enforce food and work safety standards or environmental 
standards and had no desire to regulate the oligopoly medicine market. Higher social 
and economic stress combined with lower protection of workers and customers led 
to sharp deterioration of quality of life and health environment for a large part of 
the population.  
 
Apart from the social and economic hardships of transition, the problems of the 
Bulgarian healthcare stem largely from deficiencies of public health management. In a 
nutshell, institutional failures can be summarized in three types of shortage:  
 Shortage of political will for timely launch and completion of 
health sector reforms.  
 Shortage of public funds 
 Shortage of public health management skills 
 
Health care reforms were delayed for about a decade, starting in earnest not 
before 1999. Under the old system health care was provided for free by the state through 
polyclinics and hospitals and was financed by general revenues. Medicines for home use 
were heavily subsidized. The advantages of this system over a market-based system are 
that it ensures universal coverage and access. The problem however is that central 
allocation of health care funds and lack of competition in the provision of services reduce 
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efficiency and provide little incentives for quality improvements. The reform path 
chosen by Bulgaria was a halfway shift from the old system to a new one in which 
the state runs a universal compulsory health-insurance system, which contracts the 
provision of services either with private practices (in the case of outpatient 
healthcare), or public hospitals (in the case of inpatient healthcare). Privatization of 
the hospitals was blocked, while private insurance funds have found themselves in 
uneven competition with the NHIF. As a result the seven years after the launch of 
comprehensive health reform, the outcomes are mixed with some progress achieved 
mainly in the outpatient service sector. The restructuring of the hospital sector stalled. 
Differences in incomes have caused outflow of specialists from the inpatient to outpatient 
health sector, even though physicians are allowed to work both in a hospital and in a 
private specialized practice. Motivation of medical staff has fallen drastically, the number 
of nurses, who are in shortage in many advanced countries has dropped. The practice of 
informal payments for hospital services has become pervasive and tends to get 
institutionalized through the public-private status of some hospital physicians. 
 
Public health expenditures are low in international standards. International 
comparisons based on public consumption expenditure indicate that Bulgaria has the 
lowest public spending on health in the region except for Albania. The gap in financing is 
even more pronounced in terms of per-capita spending, where Bulgaria has the lowest 
indicator among the new member states of the EU. It is also among the lowest on the 
Balkans. Health insurance contributions are obligatory and are paid on a payroll basis 
with the larger share paid by the employer. It is in the amount of 6 percent on insurance 
income, shared between the employer and the employee in the ratio of 65:35 in 2006.  
 
Private health expenditures are in the range of 2-3 percent of GDP and are mainly 
individual payments by the patients. Additional private pre-paid plans have insignificant 
share of the health insurance market 
 
The restructuring of the outpatient service center is more or less completed. 
Primary healthcare is provided entirely by private GPs operating under contracts with the 
NHIF. Their income is a result of customer payments per visit and payments by the 
NHIF. The latter are based on registered patients (about 60 percent); and performed 
activities under infant, maternity and prophylactics healthcare programs (about 40 
percent). The payment mechanism of the specialized (secondary) healthcare is similar, 
but specialists receive their money from the NHIF on per-visit basis. The remaining 
problems in the outpatient service sector are those of coverage and access as well as 
excessive regulations and weak incentives. 
 
The hospital sector suffers from more serious institutional deficiencies. The 
transition to NHIF based financing has been completed in 2006, but persisting problems 
prove that this transition is hardly able to provide the optimal solutions without 
restructuring the still predominantly public hospital sector. There are two major problems 
in the sector. The first one is the insolvency of a large part of the hospitals. The second 
one is the low wages and corruption. The problem of hospital arrears to suppliers is 
partly due to soft budget constraints in the past, but more importantly reflects flaws in the 
 7
mechanisms of NHIF financing. Despite the number of consultancy projects on preparing 
the introduction of DRG-based financing, relations with the NHIF are still based on 
clinical pathways, which is prone to abuse and deviation of hospital receipts from optimal 
costs. There is not a clear vision about the transition to what is believed to be a superior 
system under which insurance receipts reflect actual demand for hospital services rather 
than service-provision contracts with the NHIF. The problem with low wages has been 
addressed through allowing hospital physicians to work in outpatient private practices as 
well as through giving more discretion to the managers of hospitals in regard to hospital 
budgets.  
 
Quality of healthcare services is pursued through regulative controls at entry 
rather than adequate financial incentives and monitoring of the quality of output. The 
major instruments in this regard are the accreditation mechanism and the medical 
standards. The accreditation of the healthcare providers aims at ensuring minimum 
standards of equipment and qualifications for the list of services covered by the NHIF. 
There are 24 medical standards, which regulate in details the requirements for the 
medical equipment, the necessary medical staff and qualifications; and contain detailed 
definitions of the syndromes covered by the standard and the respective interventions. 
Thus quality is guaranteed through minimum requirements on inputs. Apart from these 
entry-level regulations, the money reimbursed by the NHIF is in no way related to further 
quality-enhancing inputs such as professional training or investment in new technologies 
and innovations. Little is done even to measure and monitor the quality of the output of 
healthcare interventions if not to encourage it. With competition virtually absent, the 
medical practices and hospitals have little incentive to spend on professional training and 
more efficient technologies. The system is designed to attain some uniform minimum 
level of standards. At the same time enforcement is weak, as neither the Ministry of 
health nor the NHIF have adequate capacity to impose sanctions or to refuse accreditation 
of entities in the areas with limited coverage and access, where quality problems are most 
pronounced. With a system relying excessively on sanctions and given the weak 
enforcement capacity, policymakers find themselves in a vicious circle of intensifying 
regulations and controls with deteriorating compliance by doctors.  
 
The reforms aimed at creating an insurance-based healthcare system, which 
provides equitable access and coverage together with consumer choice and competition 
between providers. Restructuring was announced to aim at a system based on the 
principle “money follows the patient”, i.e. distribution of public funds according to the 
number of patients and volume of activities, as well as according to the results.  
 
The actual outcomes are far from satisfactory and are still closer to the principle 
“money follows the regulations”. The healthcare system suffers from excess capacity, 
poor maintenance, inefficient utilization of resources and old diagnostic and treatment 
technologies. The average Bulgarian pays higher cost in insurance money, formal and 
informal individual payments than the citizens of other transition countries for worse 
services. The present day system ignores investment in new technology and in 
professional training. Health protection, prevention of diseases and prophylactics remain 
still outside the focus of the restructuring and are underfinanced and poorly managed. 
 8
Last but not least, access to basic services for the most vulnerable groups of society is 
limited and uneven. In this context this study identifies several pressing challenges that 
need to be addressed in the short term. 
 
Firstly, there is unfinished agenda in the restructuring of the outpatient service 
sector. It concerns above all the problems of access and coverage as well as the optimal 
balance between per-capita and activity based financing. More money needs to be 
allocated to prevention and prophylactics in order to reduce the risks and the burden of 
the health insurance and inpatient service sectors. The clue is in improving the access to 
primary and specialized health care services of the social groups at risk. Financial 
incentives designed to attract medical staff to these groups and remote and rural areas 
need to be increased and better targeted. The efficiency and outreach of the various 
national health programs is also to be reconsidered through comprehensive cost-benefit 
analyses.  
 
Secondly, large part of the problems of health service provision stems from the 
incomplete coverage of the insurance system. It leaves those groups, that are most 
exposed to health risks outside the shelter of public healthcare. The state needs to 
optimize payroll tax collection policies rather than to punish those who have little 
responsibility for irregular contributions by their employers and to finalize regulations for 
those who remain outside the coverage of the insurance system.  
 
Thirdly, public policy and regulation in the field of public procurement of 
medicines needs to go through major reassessment and restructuring. Guarantees are 
needed that hospitals spend the appropriate amount for medicines for each of the 
contracted clinical pathways with the NHIF, so that medicine costs do not fall on the 
insured persons. The list of medicines for outpatient use reimbursed by the NHIF should 
be set at a minimum with more room left to private insurers. A more activist price 
monitoring and control on this oligopoly market needs also to be considered.  
 
Fourthly, most pressing problems of healthcare stem from the impasse in the 
hospital care sector. Hospital financing is still far from optimal, with NHIF refunds 
reflecting supply potential rather than actual demand and cost of services. This calls for 
reconsideration of the financial relations between hospitals and the NHIF and a shift 
towards financing based on diagnostically-related groups. 
 
Last but not least, the role of the private sector and the nature of private-public 
interface in the healthcare sector need to be reconsidered. The private sector is still kept 
away from the market of health insurance and hospital healthcare. Advanced health 
systems try to find the optimal balance between market choice and incentives on the one 
hand and the responsibilities of the state, on the other. Usually the state takes primary 
responsibility for improved coverage and access for the groups that are most exposed to 
health risks. Second it manages the pursuit of national health priorities, such as active 
prevention, immunization and prophylactic policies, the outcome of which are monitored 
through the standard indicators. The objectives of wider consumer choice are entrusted to 
the private sector. In the context of Bulgaria this would imply more active involvement of 
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the private sector in the provision of inpatient services and individual or collective pre-
paid plans. The state has regulatory and control responsibilities on both the insurance and 
the health service markets, but the current balance between incentives on one hand and 
controls and sanctions on the other needs to be redressed in favor of better targeted 
incentives.  
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Introduction 
Bulgarian healthcare sector is among the areas, where structural reforms of 
transition have stalled. The unquestionable achievement of the last seven years of reforms 
is the completed transition to insurance-based financing. The benefits for consumers 
however, are still to come. A large part of the population lost access to healthcare; and 
those that did not are far from satisfied with the services provided. Technology is old, 
hospital staff has little motivation, and corruption is pervasive. In balance in the first 16 
years of transition, the system lost much of its former advantages of universal coverage 
and access, without gaining yet much of the advantages of a market-based provision of 
services – i.e. technology innovation, higher quality and customer satisfaction. This 
makes healthcare one of the few areas, where the benefits of transition and accession to 
the EU are questionable for both consumers and providers of healthcare services, that is 
for most stakeholders except for a limited number of consultants, lenders to the state and 
international medicine suppliers.  
The major drivers of deteriorated access to services are drop in incomes, 
unemployment and evasion of health insurance contributions. But there are as well major 
institutional deficiencies that account for a large part of the poor quality of healthcare 
services.  
This paper looks at those institutional deficiencies. It studies the outcomes of the 
transition from the former system of entirely state-run and financed healthcare to 
insurance-based system and identifies three groups of institutional failures: delayed, 
incomplete and inconsistent reforms, shortage of public health expenditures and shortage 
of public health management skills. Bulgaria chose a halfway shift to a private provision 
of outpatient services and public provision of inpatient services with a monopoly state-
run insurance system in the center. The market share of private hospitals as well as of 
private pre-paid insurance plans is insignificant. Quality of service is ensured through 
regulations rather than market incentives. It is achieved through the accreditation based 
on detailed medical standards, i.e. it applies controls at market entry level. Beyond that, 
the money received from the NHIF has little relation with the healthcare provider’s 
spending on new technology, professional training, R&D. and other quality-enhancing 
measures. With customer choice, largely a fiction, service providers’ incomes do not 
depend much on the quality of services provided, but much more on the supply contract 
achieved with the NHIF.  
Section first studies the specific challenges to the healthcare system confronted by 
an economy in transition. Section two discusses the institutional failures of the health 
service sectors, which stem from bad public sector management and vision rather than 
from the shocks of transition. Sections three and four are dedicated to the reforms in the 
outpatient and the inpatient sector respectively. Section five concludes by identifying the 
relevant policy implications.  
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Health challenges of transition and accession 
Health indicators 
Bulgaria’s transition to a market economy in the last 16 years is marked by a 
deterioration of the majority of standard health indicators. This negative outcome reflects 
a mix of adverse demographic, economic and institutional factors. 
Adverse demographic trends have started long before the start of transition (see 
fig. 1), and are common for most countries in Europe. Advanced European economies, 
however had the 
necessary financial and 
administrative resources 
and flexibility to adjust 
to the demographic 
challenges without 
major shocks on their 
health systems. 
In the case of 
Bulgaria, declining birth 
rates and rising 
mortality led to negative 
growth since the start of 
transition, with the gap 
widening dramatically in 
the subsequent sixteen 
years. Birth rates 
declined by more than 
15 per cent in the years 
of transition: from 10‰ 
in 1993 to 8.5 ‰ in 
2002. Fertility rate (i.e. children per woman) of 1.2 in 2004 is the lowest in CEE. Drop in 
birth rates coupled with a rise of mortality rates resulted in negative natural growth of - 
0.7 per cent in average in 1994-2004, which is worse than all countries in Europe except 
for Latvia (see app. 1). The impact of negative natural growth had been reinforced by a 
considerable migrant outflow of predominantly young people in the years of transition. 
This led to a relatively heavy problem of ageing population. Even though this is a 
common problem for most European countries, it is indicative that in Bulgaria the share 
of the population aged over 60 of 22.3 percent in 2004 is among the highest in Europe 
(see app. 1). This inevitably generates strong pressure on the health system, whose 
capacity to respond to these challenges was seriously undermined by shortage of funds. 
Life expectancy at birth, which was one of the highest in CEE in the 1980s 
remained unchanged at 71-72 years throughout the years of transition. Meanwhile all 
other countries in the region marked considerable gains in this regard, leaving Bulgaria 
with the lowest longevity records in Europe (see app. 1). Mortality rate has shown an 
upward trend, which after a peak of 14.7 per thousand in 1997 tends to flatten at slightly 
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lower level. It however is the highest among the new member states as well as in south-
eastern Europe.  
Age-wise, population in the active age range of 16 to 64 accounts for 48 percent 
of all deaths. The male to female ratio in this range is about 2:1 - 31.5 percent versus 16.4 
percent of all deaths. Rural mortality is twice higher than urban mortality: 20.4‰ versus 
11.7‰ in 2002. 
 
Table 1. 
Adult mortality in central and eastern Europe 1989-2003 
(deaths per thousand population) 
 1989 1993 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Czech Republic 12.3 11.4 10.9 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.6 10.9
Hungary 13.8 14.5 13.9 14.0 13.3 13.0 13.1 13.4
Poland 10.1 10.2 10.0 9.9 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.6
Slovakia 10.2 9.9 9.5 9.7 9.8 9.6 9.6 9.7
Slovenia 9.4 10.0 9.4 9.5 9.3 9.3 9.4 9.7
Estonia 11.8 14.2 13.4 13.4 13.4 13.6 13.5 - 
Latvia 12.2 15.3 14.0 13.7 13.6 14.0 13.9 13.9
Lithuania 10.4 12.5 11.9 11.4 11.1 11.6 11.8 11.9
Bulgaria 12.0 12.9 14.0 13.6 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.3
Romania 10.7 11.6 12.7 11.8 11.4 11.6 12.4 12.3
Albania 5.6 5.6 5.3 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.3 5.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina 6.9 - 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.7 7.6 - 
Croatia 11.0 10.6 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.2 11.4 11.8
FYR Macedonia 7.7 8.1 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.3 8.8 8.9
Serbia and Montenegro 9.5 10.2 10.6 10.9 11.1 10.6 10.2 - 
Source: TransMonee 2005 
 
Most common death causes 
in Bulgaria are heart attacks and 
brain insults. Classified together as 
diseases of the circulatory system, 
they account for more than two 
thirds of all deaths in the recent 
years (fig. 2). These cases amount to 
70 -100 thousand deaths per year, 
which is about the size of most 
Bulgaria’s major cities (district 
capitals). In international perspective 
Bulgaria has one of the highest 
scores in this indicator among the 
nations ranked by the WHO. The 
reasons for the rising mortality due 
to circulatory system syndromes in 
Bulgaria is attributed to the stronger 
health risks related to smoking, bad 
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nutrition, alcohol, stress, lack of physical activities and bad healthcare. 2  
Malignant neoplasms come second in the list of most common causes for death in 
Bulgaria. About one in seven deaths is due to cancer. Cancer cases have been growing 
steadily in the years of transition (see app. 2). The leaders among them are lung cancer, 
followed by cancer of the rectum and the stomach as well as breast cancer and prostate 
cancer. Again, the growing cancer incidence and mortality reflect growing health risks 
related to smoking, pollution, as well as the lack of early diagnostics.  
An important synthetic indicator of the quality of the health system is infant 
mortality rate. In the beginning of transition this indicator placed Bulgaria in a similar 
position with central European countries and even better position than Poland and 
Hungary. About 15 years later it is in the bottom of the list with only Romania and 
Albania having higher infant mortality rate on the Balkans. It is indicative that other 
Balkan countries with much worse starting positions achieved considerable improvement 
relative to Bulgaria despite the years of conflicts and political turmoil. (table 2) 
 
Table 2.  
Infant mortality rate in central and eastern Europe 1989-2003 
(deaths per thousand live births) 
 1989 1993 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Czech Republic 10.0 8.5 6.0 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.1 3.9
Hungary 15.7 12.5 10.9 8.4 9.2 8.1 7.2 7.3
Poland 19.1 16.1 12.2 8.9 8.1 7.7 7.5 7.0
Slovakia 13.5 10.6 10.2 8.3 8.6 6.2 7.6 7.9
Slovenia 8.1 6.8 4.7 4.5 4.9 4.2 3.8 4,0
Estonia 14.8 15.6 10.5 9.6 8.4 8.8 5.7 - 
Latvia 11.3 16.2 15.9 11.3 10.4 11.0 9.8 9.4
Lithuania 10.7 15.4 10.0 8.6 8.5 7.8 7.9 6.8
Bulgaria 14.4 15.5 15.6 14.6 13.3 14.4 13.3 12.3
Romania 26.9 23.3 22.3 18.6 18.6 18.4 17.3 16.7
Albania 30.8 33.2 25.8 12.3 12.1 12.1 14.6 17.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina 18.4 22.7 14.0 10.1 9.7 7.6 9.4 - 
Croatia 11.7 9.9 8.4 7.7 7.4 7.7 7.0 6.3
FYR Macedonia 36.7 24.1 16.4 14.9 11.8 11.9 10.2 11.3
Serbia and Montenegro 29.3 21.9 15.0 13.6 13.3 13.1 10.2 - 
Source: TransMonee 2005 
 
The probability of a child dying before the age of five is about three times higher 
in Bulgaria (15‰) than in the EU-15 and about two times higher than in the new member 
states (EU-10). Similarly to infant mortality at birth, only Albania and Romania have 
worse indicators than Bulgaria in 2004 (see appendix 1). Furthermore, national averages 
hide wide regional disparities. Infant mortality rate in rural areas and regions with ethnic 
minorities is much higher. In Sliven for instance it is 30‰. The leading causes for the 
high infant mortality rates are premature births or complications in the prenatal period as 
well as pneumonia and various infections.  
                                                 
2 Ministry of Health The Health of the Nations in the beginning of 21st century, , (in Bulgarian language) 
Aug. 2004, p. 24 
 14
Deteriorated coverage and access 
Large part of the challenges to the health system of transition is related to 
coverage and access. These problems stem mainly from the drop in incomes and 
increased economic vulnerability of a large part of the population combined with the 
transition to insurance-based system. Poverty and poor health status are strongly 
correlated in a vicious circle, in which poverty leaves more people out of the coverage of 
health insurance, while poor health creates more unemployment, and social exclusion. 
According to a World Bank poverty study on Bulgaria, in only two years of a dramatic 
economic and financial crisis of 1996-1997, poverty rates increased about 6-7 times: 
from 5.5 percent to 36 percent.3 Even though it has subsequently fallen to 12-13 percent 
it is still much higher than in the pre-crisis period. Currently it is estimated at about 13.4 
percent according to the Eurostat methodology.4 This figure, even though commensurate 
with comparator countries, does not reveal considerable poverty gaps (dubbed pockets of 
poverty) in the rural areas and the areas with concentration of ethnic minorities, where 
the pressure on the health system is the strongest. 
The problems of coverage and poverty are most visible in the sphere of 
immunizations and prophylactics of some infectious diseases, the incidence of which 
increased during the years of transition. A case in point is tuberculosis. In 1985-1991 the 
incidence of tuberculosis in Bulgaria was in the range of 0.25-0.29‰ (in). Since the start 
of transition it started to grow by 1 percent each year, scoring an average of 0.43 ‰ in 
1993-2003 with a peak in 1998. These levels are about 3.5 times above the EU-15 
averages of about 0.12 ‰.5 The reason for the outburst of tuberculosis is to be attributed 
to deficiencies in the monitoring and diagnosing of the disease as well as to inadequate 
prophylactic and preventive measures in the hotbeds of contamination and the population 
at risk. Part of the initial rise in registered cases in the early 1990s can be attributed to 
improved monitoring and accountability relative to the years of state health care. The 
continuing upward trend throughout the 1990s however, shows that there are real flaws in 
the system of prevention of infectious diseases. These flaws can be traced down to 
problems with coverage and access inherent in the process of restructuring.  
Increased health risks at home and at work 
Apart from the problems of coverage and access, the transition to market 
economy brought some new or increased health risks for all income groups. The big bang 
liberalization of prices and entrepreneurship without the adequate legal environment to 
protect property rights, and the rights of consumers and employees, led to a drastic 
increase in health risks in everyday life. First, there was a lot of social stress. The abrupt 
drop in output and the closure of many state-run enterprises produced some winners, but 
much more losers, especially among the qualified workforce who relied on their 
qualification to make a living. Both winners and losers were placed almost overnight in 
stressful competition without clear rules and virtually no protection by law enforcement 
and judicial institutions. The state had little capacity to enforce work safety or 
                                                 
3 World Bank Bulgaria: Poverty Assessment, Washington DC, 2003 
4 Eurostat measures poverty rate as the percentage of households with incomes below the threshold of 60 
percent of the median income 
5 Ministry of Health The Health of the Nations in the beginning of 21st century, Aug. 2004, (in Bulgarian 
language) p. 18 
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environmental standards. 
Higher social and economic 
stress combined with lower 
protection of workers and 
citizens led to sharp 
deterioration of quality of life 
and health environment for a 
large part of the population. 
Many young families 
would leave the country in 
search of better employment 
opportunities or for study 
abroad. A large part of the 
emigrants, especially short-term 
and seasonal workers would be 
covered neither by the 
Bulgarian health insurance 
system nor by social and health 
insurance abroad and would pose additional pressure on the nascent and weak domestic 
health insurance system. Many of them would come to Bulgaria to get medical and dental 
services. 
It was not before the process of accession gained speed that some of those initial 
shocks on the health system of transition started to ease off. The most prominent among 
them perhaps are the improvement in the monitoring and control on environmental 
standards and safety-at-work regulations. Of course there is still a long way to go in these 
two areas as the transposition of EU norms is still not completed and enforcement is 
weak. But on balance these two areas together with the restructuring of the health 
financing are among the few advantages of transition and accession in the field of health 
care.  
The overall picture of the reasons for hospitalization shows that the major 
drivers for the worsening health indicators are related to increased smoking, drinking and 
nutrition risks, environmental pollution, increased stress and risks of injuries and traumas. 
The latter are both injuries at work  as well as road accidents. 
The leader among those is the group of the respiratory diseases (fig. 3). 
Pneumonia is among the leading causes of death in this group accounting to about half of 
all lethal outcomes of treatment of respiratory diseases. 
The share of psychiatric diseases is also on the rise. Statistical data, however, may 
be hiding the real size of the problem, as not all affected seek medical advice. 
Furthermore, even if they do seek it, not always their problem is adequately diagnosed. 
The MH reports that only about one in three patients in need of psychiatric help is 
adequately diagnosed and referred to a specialist by GPs. As this type of disease is not 
among the leading mortality factors, it remains outside the focus of statistics. Psychiatric 
and psychological problems however, often have heavier economic and social costs in 
terms of working disability, treatment costs and negative health effects on the 
surrounding people at work and at home. 
 16
Primary disability
Loss of 
capacity 
under 
50%
Loss of 
capacity 
50-70%
Loss of 
capacity 
over 
90%
Loss of 
capacity 
71-90%
5.7%
34.8
19.3
40.2
Fig. 4 
Source: Ministry of Health
Last but not least, the list of health challenges of transition includes growing 
disability rates. The number of disabled persons grew three times in the years of 
transition. The growth is partly attributed to the change in the legal definition of disabled 
persons. Nevertheless, the indicator of newly registered disability cases of 9.5 ‰ is far 
above the European average of 5.5 ‰, and one of the highest in the world (9th position of 
the 51 nations in the WHO 2001 ranking). Bulgaria’s census data of 2001 point at about 
265 thousand physically handicapped. According to NSSI data about 330 thousand 
people are certified with disability of over 50 per cent. NGO estimates of the number of 
physically handicapped are even higher, in the range more than 400 thousand people. 
About ¾ of all certified disability cases for pension purposes are in the range of heavy 
disability of over 70 per cent, with 35 per cent of all falling in the heaviest category of 
disability over 90 per cent (fig. 4). Term-wise, about ¾ of disability pensions are for a 
period of 2-3 years. The major causes for disability are again diseases of the circulatory 
system (37 per cent of new disability registrations), the bone and muscle system (14 per 
cent) the nervous system (11 per cent), etc. Those data may need to be treated with 
caution as there are allegations and evidence of abuse and corruption in the sphere of 
disability pension certificates.  
Acquired Institutional Deficiency Syndromes 
A large group of drivers of the above outlined deterioration of health indicators is 
related to deficiencies of public health management system. In a nutshell, institutional 
flaws can be summarized in three types of shortage:  
 Shortage of political will for timely launch and completing of 
health sector reforms.  
 Shortage of public funds 
 Shortage of public health management skills 
Delayed and incomplete reforms 
It was not before the first ten years of transition passed in strategic planning and 
consultancy projects that health care reforms actually started in 1999. Furthermore, 
instead of pursuing a 
comprehensive market-based 
reform, Bulgaria chose a halfway 
shift to a system in which only the 
provision of the outpatient sector is 
entrusted to the private sector. 
Hospitals remaind public. 
Insurance in fact is also public as 
private and public providers depend 
on the compulsory state insurance 
run by the National Health 
Insurance Fund. 
Under the old system health 
care was provided by the state 
through polyclinics and hospitals. 
Health services and medicines in 
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them were free of charge and financed by the budget. Medicines for home use were 
heavily subsidized. The disadvantages of this system are well studied and well known. 
They are related to the fact that central allocation of health care funds and lack of 
competition in service provision reduce efficiency, and do not provide incentives for 
better services. In this context, private health insurance is superior in terms of the 
efficiency incentives to the providers of services and medical insurance. Market 
competition puts medical staff under pressure to provide better services at lower cost, 
while encouraging insurers to offer competitive insurance packages. Most advanced 
market economies rely on privately run insurance system where customers and their 
employers contribute to private health insurance funds, which in turn reimburse all or part 
of the cost of medical services. 
The disadvantages of this system are related to market inefficiencies. The markets 
alone can hardly deliver the outputs of active healthcare policies such as high 
immunization rates, wider access, coverage and protection of the risk groups, which 
usually remain outside the coverage of the private insurance system. For public 
economists, active health care policies, such as prevention of diseases and reduction of 
health risks, are good illustration of positive externalities. In this case social benefits 
exceed private costs, which is the economic rationale for the intervention by the state. 
The argument is that considerable gains in health safety for society at large are hardly 
possible without providing access to health care for the low income groups which are 
most exposed to health risks. Furthermore, the insurance and health market usually 
require some degree of state regulation and oversight in order to ensure consumer rights 
and health care standards. 
Therefore many countries opt for some kind of mixed system, trying to unite both 
the state’s responsibilities in regard to health policies and health and social protection of 
the most vulnerable groups of society with the opportunities that the market creates for a 
choice of a service provider according to the consumers’ ability to pay. The state retains 
the major responsibility for the regulation and supervision of the insurance and healthcare 
market in order to guarantee some standards of services and to protect consumer rights. 
These include licensing and oversight of the insurance providers and accreditation and 
supervision of healthcare providers.  
Bulgarian health reform is also a mix between public and private responsibilities. 
The state chose to run the insurance system, while outsourcing the provision of health 
care to public providers. Thus, the Bulgarian healthcare system is state-run insurance 
system (institutionalized in the National Health Insurance Fund) with private provision of 
outpatient services and public provision of inpatient services. The reform launched in 
1999 introduced three levels of health services. The first level comprises the services of 
the general practitioner (GP) as a first point of entry into the system, where the visitor 
receives medical check-up treatment and medicine prescription, or is referred to a 
specialist or hospital. The GP can issue as well a document authorizing the absence from 
work due to sickness (bolnichen list). This document is the certificate for temporary 
disability, based on which the NSSI pays to the employer social insurance compensation 
for each day of absence starting from the second one. The second level of health care 
comprises medical (and dental) services provided by specialists. They belong to the 
outpatient service sector, even though the cabinets and specialized labs may physically be 
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located in the hospitals. If their intervention is not enough they can refer further the 
patient to a hospital or other inpatient healthcare entity. 
The tertiary level includes inpatient services, mainly hospitals and dispensaries. 
They are covered by medical insurance only when the patient has the necessary referral 
from a GP or a specialist. The number of referrals issued by a doctor however is subject 
to monthly ceilings. Customers often report that they have been denied specialized 
service or deferred to the next month because the GP has run out of referrals.  
Financing 
Like most health reforms, the Bulgarian one has been driven by and aiming to 
solve one major problem: shortage of public funds. The share of public spending in GDP 
is in the range of 4-5 per cent of GDP. (Table 3).  
 
Table 3.  
Public Expenditure on Health in Bulgaria 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Public health exp. (% of GDP) 3.9 3.7 4.0 4.5 4.8 4.6 4.8 
% of total  public exp.  9.8 8.6 9.6 11.3 10.1 10.5 11.1 
share of social insurance in public health exp. 9.9 13 35.8 40.6 51.6 63.2 76.1 
Source: NSI 
 
International comparisons based on public consumption expenditure indicate that 
Bulgaria has the lowest public spending on health in the region except for Albania (see 
table 4). The gap in financing is even more pronounced in terms of per-capita spending, 
where Bulgaria has the lowest indicator among all EU NMS. It is also among the lowest 
on the Balkans.  
The low level of public health spending prior to the reform required a radical 
change in the way health care is financed. The great success of the health reform is that in 
about 6 years the system shifted from predominantly budget financing to insurance 
financing. In the center of this major move is  the National Health Insurance Fund 
(NHIF) established in 1999. It started to reimburse GPs and specialists on July 1 2000. 
While transition to insurance financing in the outpatient health sector was completed fast, 
the hospital care sector took about five years. It started one year later, on July 1 2001, but 
until 2006 hospitals were financed jointly by the NHIF, the central and the local 
government. It was not until 2006, that public financing of hospitals came almost entirely 
from the NHIF. 
Health insurance contributions are obligatory and are paid on a payroll basis in 
the amount of 6 per cent on insurance income with the larger share paid by the employer. 
Since the beginning of the reform the sharing of health-insurance contribution has been 
shifting from the employer to the employee, starting from 80:20 in 2000 to 50:50 in 2009. 
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Table 4.  
Bulgaria’s Public Health Expenditures in International Perspective 
 
consumption spending in 
percent of GDP*  
per capita in USD (average 
annual rates)  
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Czech Republic 5.4 5.0 5.1 5.5 6.1 347 327 373 471 600 
Hungary 5.4 5.0 5.1 5.5 5.8 250 231 258 348 495 
Poland 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.4 - 177 172 210 234 248 
Slovakia 5.2 4.9 5.0 5.1 - 196 186 193 228 318 
Slovenia 6.7 6.9 7.1 5.8 - 628 640 683 751 930 
Estonia 4.9 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.4 197 170 176 203 282 
Latvia 4.1 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3 114 107 110 129 155 
Lithuania 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.1 3.9 145 148 160 197 267 
Bulgaria 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.9 3.2 63 58 69 88 104 
Romania 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.1 54 59 65 79 100 
Albania 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.8 - 35 33 37 41 49 
Croatia 5.3 6.5 5.4 - - 333 330 317 325 413 
Bosnia&Herzegovina - - - - - 76 58 54 62 85 
Serbia-Montenegro 4.1 3.6 - - - 45 34 54 86 136 
FYR Macedonia 5.0 4.5 5.8 5.0 5.4 98 91 86 107 136 
Source: * TransMONEE 2005; **WHR 2006 
 
Private health insurance is allowed and available, but is still insignificant. World 
Health Report 2006 data show that all the public spending of 2-3 per cent of GDP that 
complements public spending on health is in fact out-of-pocket money paid by the 
patients (table 5). Moreover, this figure does not include informal payments. Thus, the 
burden of health financing that falls on the client in Bulgaria is much heavier than that in 
comparator countries.  
 
Table 5. 
Bulgaria’s public and private expenditures on health 
 
Indicator 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
% of GDP 6 6.2 7.2 7.9 7.5 
o/w public (%) 65.4 59.2 56.1 56.6 54.5 
private(%) 34.6 40.8 43.9 43.4 45.5 
o/w out-of pocket (%) 99 99 99.2 98.4 98.4 
Source: WHR 2006  
 
The question here of course is: if the patients in Bulgaria pay almost the same 
amount of money above and under the table as the government, why do they not buy 
private health insurance? The share of pre-paid plans in private health expenditure 
according to the WHR 2006 report is under 1 per cent. The issue of the failure of the 
private health insurance market is of primary importance for the future chances of the 
reforms.  
On the supply side, the explanation lies in the fact that private insurance can 
hardly compete with the state insurance as it cannot offer much better services. From the 
patient’s perspective, the advantages of complementing the mandatory state insurance 
with a private one is mainly in the wider choice of healthcare service provider, as well as 
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Box 1. Legal Framework 
 Law on Health (2004), amended 2 times in 
2005, successor of the National Health Act 
(1973) amended 22 times between 1991 
and 2003 
 Law on Health Insurance (1998), amended 
32 times 
 Law on Healthcare Entities (1999) 
amended 6 times 
 Law on Human Medicines and Pharmacy 
(1995), amended 18 times 
 Law on Narcotic Drugs and Precursors 
(1999) amended 6 times 
 Food Safety Law (1999) amended 2 times 
 Law on Healthy and Safe Conditions of 
Labor (1997) amended 8 times 
 Law on the Professional Organizations of 
Medical and Dental Doctors (1998) 
 Law on the Professional Organizations of 
Nurses (2005) 
 Law on Transplantation of organs, tissues 
and cells (2003) 
 Law on Blood and Blood Transfusion 
(2003)
in the reimbursement of all prescribed medicines. Both these advantages have been 
gradually reduced with consumer choice and medicine coverage expanding in the NHIF 
system as well. Thus, private insurance cannot offer much different packages from the 
NHIF. Both the NHIF and private health insurance funds rely on the same health service 
providers, but the latter depend almost entirely on the contracts with the NHIF. 
While the extra benefits of having a separate prepaid plan are not so big, the extra 
costs are substantial. First, it does not eliminate the obligation to contribute to the state 
insurance scheme. Second, there is not much tax advantage for the individual buyer of 
private insurance. The tax deduction from the personal income tax base for pre-paid plans 
is up to 10 per cent of the base. Finally, it may not be easy to buy attractive pre-paid 
individual plan. Private health insurance market in Bulgaria is still nascent with limited 
risk assessment capacity and targets predominantly corporate clients and individual 
travelers. In fact few people have private health insurance, unless it is a part of 
employer’s package.  
Incentives to employers to buy pre-paid plans for their employees are fairly 
limited. These expenses are treated for tax purposes as social expenses, which together 
with other private insurance plans have a common ceiling of BGL 40 (around EUR 20) 
per person per month. Above that limit they are taxed as social expenses with a flat rate 
of 17 per cent in 2005. With a corporate income tax rate of 15 per cent, employers 
actually have insignificant tax incentive to buy additional private health insurance. The 
reduction of this tax to 12 per cent in 2006 increased a little bit this incentive, but the 
impact is still to come.6 Therefore some private 
health insurance funds try to attract corporate 
clients by providing the obligatory safety-at-
work monitoring and medical check-ups with 
health insurance. 
In balance, the state has put tight limits 
on the expansion of private health insurance. 
This policy leads to crowding out of private 
insurers from the market and reduction of 
competition. Instead of drawing some measures 
to encourage private health insurance, the new 
health strategy concludes that this market is 
underdeveloped and inefficient and therefore 
calls for more stringent regulations and control 
on the quality of services reimbursed by the 
NHIF. Obviously, a radical change in the current 
pattern of public-private partnership is one of the 
biggest issues of the reform effort, which remain 
largely ignored. 
                                                 
6 Thus on 100 leva paid for health insurance in 2005 an employer will spend 10.2 leva on social spending 
tax, and will save 16.53 leva of corporate income tax, the net incentive being 6.33 leva, i.e. 6.3% of 
voluntary health insurance expenditure. In 2006 the net tax benefit increased to 8.9%.  
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Box 2. Policy Strategies and Programs 
 National Health Strategy 2007-2012 
 National strategy on supply of medicines 2004 
 Invasive Cardiology, 2002 - 2008 
 Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation of the 
Drug Addicts, 2001 - 2005 
 Prophylactic Oncological Screening, 2001 - 2006 
 National Program for psychic health reform (2001 
– 2010); and National Policy for Psychic Health 
(2004 – 2012 г.)  
 National Program for nephrology, and dialysis 
treatment 
 National program for control on tuberculosis 
(2004-2006) 
 National program on reducing of smoking 2002- 
2006 г. 
 Suicide Prevention 
 National Action Plan Environment – Health   
 AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Diseases 
Prevention, 2001-2007 г 
 Osteoporosis 2006 – 2010 г 
 Elimination of Measles and Rubeola, 2005 – 2010  
 Food Safety Strategy, 2000 
Public health management: legal and policy framework 
Public health management policies are shaped by a relatively recent legal 
framework of about a dozen laws (Box 1). These laws are implemented into practice by 
the annual Laws on the state budget and the Budget of the NHIF and a large number of 
implementing regulations and Ordinances by the Council of Ministers. That wide and 
complicated regulatory framework has been constantly amended in the process of 
reforms and transposition of EU 
regulations. The Health Insurance Law 
alone went through 32 amendments in 7 
years. This constant law-making under 
external pressure, which was rarely 
accompanied by regulatory impact 
assessment and conformed with the 
capacity of the administration and the legal 
system to enforce it, opened a lot of 
loopholes and vertical (among primary and 
secondary legislation) as well as horizontal 
(among regulations in the various 
healthcare areas) inconsistencies among the 
separate components of the legal 
framework. Thus, it raised serious 
challenges to the synchronization of the 
reform effort and the relations between the 
various institutions and stakeholders. 
Furthermore it created large opportunities 
for administrative discretion and corruption. 
Part of the bureaucratic chaos in the 
provision of health care services since the 
start of transition can be attributed to 
excessive law-making.  
Health policy priorities are set by about 25 public health strategies and programs. 
They address what is perceived as the highest health risks: AIDS, tuberculosis, measles 
and rubeola, cardiology, cancer screening, osteoporosis, psychic health, suicides 
prevention, drugs and tobacco, food safety, and transplantations. Many of these are part 
of various international health campaigns and donor projects. According to the 2006 
National Health Strategy prophylactic programs are worth a total of BGL 18 million (p. 
17), which is less than 1 per cent of the annual public health budget, in 2006.  
These priorities are implemented by the Ministry of Health, but other agencies 
have also leading responsibilities. The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy for instance, 
has primary responsibility for the enforcement of the safety-at-work standards; and the 
Ministry of Ecology enforces the environmental standards.  
In addition there are about a dozen of specialized agencies which have 
educational, informational and monitoring functions. Many of them have been 
established under a number of administrative capacity building donor projects in the last 
16 years. From hindsight and lacking real restructuring, most of them seem necessary but 
expensive inputs in the health reform, the benefits of which are yet to come.  
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Quality of healthcare services is pursued through regulative controls rather than 
adequate financial incentives. The major instruments in this regard are the accreditation 
mechanism and the medical standards. The accreditation of the healthcare providers aims 
at ensuring minimum standards of equipment and qualifications for the list of services 
covered by the NHIF. These requirements are listed in the Ordinance for the criteria, 
indicators and methodology of the accreditation of the healthcare facilities, which is an 
implementing legislation to the Law on Healthcare Entities. The accreditation process, 
however failed to perform the function of a filter for the system – all old inefficient 
hospitals and medical centers were licensed. One reason for that is that coverage and 
access are more important than quality in a large part of the country. Another reason is 
that often local political and social considerations outweigh quality concerns. There are 
24 medical standards, which regulate in details the requirements for the medical 
equipment, the necessary medical staff and qualifications and contain detailed definitions 
of the various syndromes covered by the standard and the corresponding interventions.  
In brief the quality management relies heavily on stringent and detailed 
regulations, which require substantial enforcement costs. Outside the standards and 
accreditation, the money reimbursed by the NHIF is in no way related to the quality of 
services. Thus, with competition virtually absent, the medical practices and hospitals 
have no incentive to spend money on HR development, or investment in new technology 
and other quality-enhancing expenditures. The system is designed to attain some uniform 
minimum level of standards. At the same time enforcement is weak, as neither the 
Ministry of health nor the NHIF have adequate capacity to impose sanctions or to refuse 
accreditation of entities in the areas with limited coverage and access, where quality 
problems are most pronounced. With a system relying excessively on sanctions and given 
the weak enforcement capacity, policymakers find themselves in a vicious circle of 
intensifying regulations and controls with deteriorating compliance by doctors and 
mutual trust.  
In result, the system suffers from excess capacity, poor maintenance, inefficient 
utilization of resources and old diagnostic and treatment technologies. The number of 
beds was reduced and the average utilization rate (bed-days per patient) has improved. 
However, this has not led to considerable cost optimization as the reduction of beds did 
not actually result in reduction of rooms and facilities. In terms of doctors per capita 
Bulgaria has always maintained very high indicator. But on the other hand there are a lot 
of vacancies, especially in medical specialists. Excess supply on one hand and 
concentration of doctors in the urban areas leads to the double problem of low wages and 
lack of motivation of medical staff and bad coverage. Additional human resource 
problem is the shortage of nurses. The major reasons are emigration of nurses to Europe 
and the undersupply by specialized colleges. The ratio in Bulgaria of doctors to nurses is 
about twice that in Europe and with rather grim prospects in the immediate future. 
 
In the end of the day the outcomes of the reforms are still fairly disappointing for 
the majority of the Bulgarians both in terms of effectiveness (i.e. the results versus the 
proclaimed objectives) and in terms of efficiency (the results versus the cost of 
attainment). In terms of effectiveness, the reforms aimed at creating an insurance-based 
healthcare system, which provides equitable access and coverage together with consumer 
choice and competition between providers. Restructuring was announced to aim at a 
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system based on the principle “money follows the patient”, i.e. distribution of public 
funds according to the number of patients and activities, as well as according to the 
results.  
The outcomes are far from satisfactory. The overall spending on health is not that 
low in international standards, but it is disproportionately distributed between state funds 
and individual payments with a large part of it going under the table. In balance, the 
average Bulgarian pays higher cost (in insurance money, formal and informal individual 
payments) than the citizens of other transition countries for worse services. The present 
day system ignores investment in new technology and in professional training. Health 
protection, prevention of diseases and prophylactics remain still outside the focus of the 
restructuring and are underfinanced and poorly managed. Last but not least, access to 
basic services for the most vulnerable groups of society is limited and uneven.  
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The outpatient service sector 
Primary health care 
Currently primary health care is provided entirely by private GPs operating under 
contracts with the NHIF. The NHIF started to reimburse them on July 1 2000. There are 
more than 6000 general practitioners (GPs) who operate mainly in individual practices 
(table 6). GPs can provide services either as natural persons (i.e. self-employed), or sole 
proprietors.  
GPs get paid for their services by the NHIF and by the customer. Customer 
payment per visit is fixed by the law to 1 percent of the minimum monthly wage, which 
in 2006 amounts to BGL 1.60. There was a debate to eliminate this fee in 2006, but it is 
an important instrument to limit some of the unnecessary visits and to increase efficiency  
 
Table 6.  
Outpatient healthcare practices in Bulgaria 2004 
 
Outpatient service providers Number Beds 
Primary healthcare individual practices  5897  
Primary healthcare group practices 224  
Primary dental care individual practices  7758  
Primary dental care group practices 142  
Specialized medical care: individual practices 6422  
Specialized medical care: group practices 124  
Specialized dental care: individual practices  152  
Specialized dental care: group practices 1  
Medical centers 454 440 
Dental centers   56 4 
Medical and Dental Centers   44 21 
Diagnostics and Consultation Centers  107 204 
Medical Laboratories  828  
 Source: National Center for Health Information 
 
The payment by the NHIF to GPs is partly based on the number of registered 
persons (per capita basis); and partly on actually performed activities. Over the past 6 
years the direction of the reform has been to shift financing from initially prevailing par 
capita monthly payments (about 85 per cent), to larger share of activity-based financing. 
Today, the latter component accounts for about 40 percent of the NHIF payments 
received by the GPs.  
The per capita component still accounts for 60 per cent. All persons with medical 
insurance are required to choose and register with a family doctor. In the beginning there 
was a minimum requirement for a contract with the NHIF of 800 registrations per doctor, 
as well as some ceilings on the number of registrations. Later on both minimum and 
maximum thresholds were dropped. The NHIF distinguishes between patients with 
chronic diseases (dispensary patients) and other customers according to their age - over 
65; below 18; and persons in the active age group between 18 and 65. Per capita monthly 
payments for each of these four groups are fixed annually in the NFC, and in 2006 are 
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respectively BGL 1.25, BGL 1.09, BGL 1.00 and BGL 0.72. The differentiated rate 
structure aims at taking into account the different GP workload and frequency of visits 
for the different client groups. The necessity of such differentiation however is doubtful, 
given the client’s fee per visit, which is sufficient to reward doctors for heavier workload 
associated with aged and dispensary patients. 
The activity-based component comprises payments per prophylactic examination 
of children or per immunization (falling under the national program ‘Infant healthcare’), 
checkups for the pregnant under the program ‘Maternal healthcare’; one prophylactic 
checkup per year for those aged over 18, and for incidental visit by an insured client who 
is not on the GP’s list (temporary residents and visitors, etc.) Payments per checkups are 
from two to five times higher than per-capita based payments. GPs also receive  
additional payments for opening a practice in areas with bad coverage (position from the 
vacancy list) or other unfavorable conditions (location, transportation etc. infrastructure).  
Despite the financial incentives, there are still problems of uneven coverage and 
poor quality of the services provided. In 2003 the average number of a GP’s customers is 
1472. In some north-east districts (oblasti) like Tyrgowishte and Razgrad, the average 
numbers exceed 2000, while in Sofia and Pleven for instance they are below 1300. The 
major policy tool that the authorities use to pursue a more even coverage is the National 
Health Map (NHM). It maps out the target coverage by regions. NHM implementation 
reports indicate large regional disparities, ranging from 67 percent in the north-east 
districts of Razgrad to 128 percent in the city of Sofia. 
Most of healthcare resources are concentrated in cities and university centers, 
while in a number of scarcely populated areas, which are also the areas with lowest rates 
of employment and insurance coverage, GPs are in shortage. The special financial 
incentives applied by the NHIF are obviously not sufficient to offset the disadvantages of 
the fewer patients and activities that form the doctor’s monthly income. The number of 
vacancies have been reduced over the years (from 1200 at the start to about 300 at 
present) and the implementation of the NHP has improved, but still wage disparities and 
related shortage of doctors in some areas remain a major challenge to public health 
management in Bulgaria. It is much more pronounced of course in the area of specialized 
medical services. 
Persisting problems of coverage and access make the proclaimed objectives of 
better consumer choice and competition relevant only in a limited number of cities. As 
quality of service cannot be driven much by competition, the incentives become of 
paramount importance. Currently, a GP has financial incentives to recruit on his NHIF 
list retirees, to pay special attention to children and maternal prophylactics, as well as to 
have larger number of visits because of the per-visit payment by the customer. But s/he 
has also the incentives not to be very strict on allowing leaves of sickness; otherwise s/he 
may lose part of its patients, especially those lower wage patients, who are insured on the 
full amount of their wages like in the public administration. S/he has also the perverse 
incentive to prescribe some of the more expensive medicines when they are reimbursed 
by the NHIF. In some cases the doctor may have additional incentive to do so, by special 
promotional schemes practiced by manufacturers and distributors of medicines, including 
direct kick-backs based on prescriptions. However, s/he has little financial incentive to 
improve the quality of services and the health status of her patients. Such outcomes are 
hard to measure and consequently do not imply financial award by the NHIF. Similarly, 
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payments by the NHIF do not contain incentives to invest in new technologies and 
professional training. Thus, such expenditures are very limited in places where  elasticity 
of demand for health care services is small, i.e. where customers do not have much 
chance to substitute the services consumed with those of alternative providers.  
In the absence of competition regulatory standards are important instruments for 
protecting the right s of the patients. They are designed to allow to the market only those 
service providers who have attained some minimum threshold of equipment and 
qualifications. Standards also define  the parameters of doctors’ intervention. But an 
advanced primary healthcare hinges crucially on a more adequate system of financial 
incentives, which can put more weight on indicators of individual performance and 
activities among the determinants of the size of the GPs compensation package. 
Furthermore, as national health priorities are to improve the health status rather than to 
increase the visits to the doctor and the treatment services provided, much more priority 
should be given to prophylactics and prevention activities, including immunization. GPs 
should be rewarded by the NHIF or the budget based on their contribution and outcomes 
of their activities in fulfillment of the national health programs.  
Specialized outpatient services 
There has been substantial progress in the restructuring of specialized healthcare. 
The number of specialized practitioners increased from 4752 at the start of the reform to 
about 6400 individual practices; and 124 group practices, about 500 medical centers, 107 
diagnostics and consultations centers (DCC) and 828 laboratories (table 6 above). Most 
of the former polyclinics in the cities have been transformed into DCC and medical 
(dental) centers and rented out by the municipalities to specialists and GPs at fairly 
reasonable rents. 
Despite those improvements, equitable access to specialized services is even more 
problematic than access to GPs. Regionally the shortage is most acute in the northern 
regions of Silistra, Razgrad and Rousse, which have 0.5 physicians per 1000 insured 
persons. For comparison, in Sofia this indicator is three times higher: 1.7 per 1000 
insured persons. Further to regional disparities, there is shortage of some specialists. 
Actually about 80 percent of all NHIF contracts cover about one third of the medical 
specialties. Specialty-wise, there is shortage relative to the targets in the national health 
map of specialists in six of these groups – cardio-surgery, pediatrics, endocrinology 
psychiatrics and skin diseases. The affected regions are those of Razgrad, Silistra, 
Smolyan and Shoumen7  
Like GPs, specialized physicians are self-employed with the NHIF being their 
single most important formal source of income. It reimburses them on per-visit basis. 
Specialized services in the mass category are reimbursed with BGL 12 (EUR 6) for an 
initial visit and half that money for the second visit without any reimbursement for 
subsequent visit. The highly specialized and laboratory services have a detailed 
reimbursement rate list, which is included in the annual NFC. A physician can claim 
payment for secondary visits up to half the amount of registered first visits, (except for 
pediatrics where the HNIF reimburse second visits up to the number of the first visits). 
Furthermore physicians charge customer fee of 1 per cent of the minimum monthly wage, 
                                                 
7 Ministry of Health, ‘Report on the Health of the Nation in the Beginning of the 21 Century. Analysis on 
the Reform in Healthcare’, Sofia, August 2004 
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as well as a non-fixed charge for services that are not covered by the NHIF. The number 
of visits to specialists is subject to regulatory restrictions in the form of monthly ceilings 
on the number of referrals that can be issued each month by a GP or a specialist.  
This structure has major deficiencies. First the quantitative monthly limits on the 
number of referrals restrict customers’ access to specialized services. Second, it shifts the 
cost of the visits after the first one to the customer, thus discouraging patients and 
physicians from follow-up checkups and complete treatment. If a good specialist can 
reach the ceiling by first visits only, s/he would not have much incentive to check the 
result of the prescribed treatment, unless the cost of these subsequent visits could be 
covered by the patient. Furthermore this practice raises the overall cost of the medical 
services as it creates a pervert incentive to refer the client to a hospital rather than to 
solve the problem in the outpatient sector, where costs are lower. This deficiency is 
extremely pronounced in some specialized interventions, which were shifted in the 
inpatient phase even though they can be performed and in the past actually were 
performed in the outpatient practices. Some biopsies are a good example. They require 
hospitalization, which seems to be designed to channel easy insurance money to hospitals 
rather than to optimize costs. 
Anecdotal evidence and press reports often show that GPs and specialists run out 
of referrals by the middle of the month and start postponing their patients’ visits to 
specialists to the beginning of the next month. Part of this shortage of referrals may 
probably be attributed as well to selective services and extortion of bribe money by some 
physicians. Finally, such flat rates per visit do not account for the different cost of the 
various specialized services and checkups. Therefore, the payment mechanism in the 
specialized outpatient health care has been subject to repeated adjustments and 
refinements. The direction however has been towards increased dependency on the NHIF 
and increased negotiations and transaction cost, rather than allowing some differentiation 
according to the nature and the cost of the procedures by co-payment by the customer 
over a base reimbursement rate.  
Dental insurance coverage in Bulgaria is fairly limited. The NHIF covers a small 
number of interventions, mainly for children. In those cases reimbursement is about 80 
per cent of the cost agreed in the NFC for patients below 18 and about 50 per cent for 
those above 18. Thus, dental care costs fall almost entirely on the insured persons.  
Apart from medical, dental and lab services, the outpatient services reimbursed by 
the NHIF also include  a part or the whole of the cost of medicines according to a list 
which is decided each year.  
To sum up, the system of outpatient healthcare suffers from excessive regulation 
and transaction costs, deficit of mutual trust between the state and the service providers 
and excessive controls. Usually the NFC is finalized very late in the year and over the 
years physicians were providing services without knowing what they are worth. 
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The hospital sector 
Inpatient services are provided through a system of central, regional and 
municipal hospitals. The number of inpatient healthcare providing institutions in Bulgaria 
exceeds 300. Of those 257 are hospitals and 49 are dispensaries (table 7). At the start of 
the reform in 2000 all of them were converted into joint-stock commercial companies 
owned by the state (central and local governments). About 20 university hospitals and 
national health centers remained an exclusive property of the state. It retained as well the 
majority share (51 percent) in the 28 regional hospitals. The remaining 49 per cent were 
split among the municipalities in the respective region. There are 102 municipal hospitals 
wholly owned by the municipalities. The number of private hospitals is 40 with 819 beds 
only. Privatization of the hospitals has not been among the priorities of the Bulgarian 
health care reform.  
 
Table 7.  
Hospitals and hospital beds by type of healthcare in Bulgaria 2004 
 
Inpatient care facilities Number Beds 
Hospitals  306 47709 
General (multi-profile) hospitals, o/w:  127 29665 
for active treatment 126 29545 
for post-treatment and rehabilitation services  1 120 
Specialized hospitals, o/w: 70 8723 
for active treatment 28 3743 
for post-hospital and sanatoria services  9 585 
for post-hospital and sanatoria and rehabilitation services  9 591 
for rehabilitation   24 3804 
Psychiatric hospitals  11 2750 
Other inpatient health service entities 2 110 
Hospitals under other central government agencies   7 1530 
Private hospitals   40 819 
Dispensaries  49 4112 
Lung and respiratory diseases   13 787 
Skin diseases  12 208 
Oncology  12 1593 
Psychiatric  12 1524 
Source: National Center for Health Information This breakdown does not include child care 
facilities and other medico-social institutions, hospices, sanatoria, emergency aid centers and other medical 
institutions and facilities and the beds in them as well as the beds in the outpatient specialized facilities. If 
they are included the total number of medical care centers exceeds 380, while number of beds is about 
53500.  
 
The restructuring of the inpatient service sector has been slowеr than that of the 
outpatient service. When the NHIF started to reimburse inpatient services on July 1 2001, 
its share in the hospital budgets was about 20 per cent. In 2006 it covers about 90 per cent 
of the public expenditures in the hospital sector. The hospital reimbursement system is 
based on the so called clinical pathways (CP). These are sets of precisely fixed 
requirements and instructions for hospital diagnostic and treatment procedures and 
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interventions according to the patients’ syndromes. The CP consists of the following 
elements: the minimum hospitalization period for each intervention or service covered by 
the CP; the codes of the diseases and procedures according to the ICD 10 and ICD 9CM; 
the minimum contract requirements, including hospital units, equipment and facilities and 
specialized physicians; the indications for hospitalization and treatment including 
treatment algorithms, instructions on completing procedures, post-treatment rehabilitation 
and work regimes. Over the years the NHIF coverage expanded from 30 CP, covering 
158 diagnoses in 2001 to 299 CP covering about 7500 diagnoses in 2006. 
The expansion of insurance coverage allowed that starting from 2006 the 
subsidies from the central and local budgets for most hospitals and dispensaries were 
eliminated and the NHIF became the only source of financing of hospital healthcare. IN 
2006 the MH retained financial responsibility only for the psychiatric dispensaries, the 
transplantation programs and activities under some national health care programs. Thus 
from a total hospital public sector budget of about BGL 835 million in 2006, BGL740 
million is to come from the NHIF, and BGL95 million is to come from the Ministry of 
Health budget. 
The expansion in coverage and the completion of the transition to insurance-based 
financing are the two major positive outcomes of the hospital care reform. There are 
however, several major pressing problems that make the hospital sector in Bulgaria far 
from the efficiency in the advanced countries. 
Most pressing is the chronic problem with hospital arrears to suppliers and their 
indebtedness. Its origins and drivers are both in the insufficient coverage by the NHIF for 
some expensive CPs and in the soft budget constraint and lack of financial discipline in 
some hospitals, who have got used over the years that irrespective of their debts the MH 
would bail them out in the end of the year and cover their unpaid bills. The shift to 
exclusive insurance-based financing is likely to reduce such behavior by hospitals, but 
given that some clinical paths are not adequately valued, the problem is likely to persist. 
In 2005 the hospital sector ended with about 200 million worth of arrears, which is close 
to 25 percent of its 2006 budget. There is no agreement yet between the NFC parties as to 
how this problem is going to be resolved. 
Of course even more important than the issue of who is paying this debt is the 
issue of its origins and its prevention in the future. The current system of CP-based 
financing has some major flaws, which impede the efficient use of resources. The 
valuation of some CP suggest that there are still some redistributive elements, designed to 
keep small hospitals alive rather than to reimburse actual CP cost. Thus, some basic CPs, 
which are crucial for the majority of the hospitals seem overvalued in comparison with 
the highly-specialized interventions requiring considerable investment. Therefore, unless 
the patients is ready to pay out of his pocket, those having the capacity to offer these 
services do not have much choice other than to refuse it in order to avoid losses. Thus, 
equity and access concerns in the reimbursement structure of CPs reduce the range of 
services provided by the hospital sector.  
There are some rigidities in claiming expenses based on CP, which also may 
result in overspending. Thus, the hospital expenses for a CP can be reimbursed only if all 
procedures and interventions that form the CP are completed. Even if they or some of 
them turn not necessary in the course of treatment, the hospital should perform or often 
just report them if it wants to avoid losses on the procedures actually performed. This all-
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or-nothing principle of reimbursement leads to overspending, or claiming reimbursement 
under a CP, from which the treatment might have deviated in the interest of the patient. 
Moreover such a risk creates a pervert incentive that the incoming patient is registered 
under the most expensive CP possible as an insurance against the need to apply more 
expensive interventions than contained in the CP corresponding to the initial syndromes. 
Last but not least, the CP financing is based on agreed framework between the 
NHIF and the respective hospital budget rather than actual costs of the services provided. 
The budget framework is drawn in line with each hospital’s capacity to accept patients 
under each of the clinical paths contracted with the NHIF. This capacity is evaluated 
based on past record and available equipment and expertise. Hospitals can claim 
overspending above that framework only up to 5 per cent. 
These hard budget constraints are a countermeasure against overvaluing of 
expenses and/or accumulation of arrears. It is designed as well to allow more equity, 
transparency and accountability in the distribution of resources among hospitals. In the 
past, a university hospital used to receive more money for the same CP than a small 
municipal hospital due to equipment and expertise differences  and quality of services 
provided. Furthermore, there were often accusations that some heavily indebted elite 
hospitals were readily bailed out and their bills covered to the full by the ruling elites who 
used them or had political connections with their managers. Given the large arrears 
accumulated by the hospitals, the MH had discretion on which hospital to bail out first 
and to what amount. 
Since 2006 all hospitals receive the same amount of money for the same CP and 
the overspending is subject to a 5 percent limit. The rationale is that the NHIF covers 
financially the minimum standard of the respective CP. If the actual quality and cost 
exceed this, the extra cost should fall on the customer provided s/he can choose between 
the basic and more qualified services. This implies that hospitals have price lists and 
patients know what is the part covered by the NHIF and what is the part that is to be paid 
by themselves.  
The adequacy of hospital financing by the NHIF is very important in the context 
of  other basic problems of the hospital care system such as  low motivation of the 
medical staff and  wide dissatisfaction from their wages. Unlike their colleagues in the 
outpatient sector, inpatient physicians are employed by the hospital. Their income and 
conditions of work depend on the quality of the hospital management. In the recent years 
the differential between the incomes of the doctors in the outpatient sector and those in 
the inpatient sector has grown significantly. This led to solutions which contain some 
conflict of interests. For instance all specialists work in a hospital, but at the same time 
have private specialized practices. This mixed ‘public-private’ workload has been typical 
for most hospital doctors and is not always in the interest of the patients or the hospital 
budget. 
Therefore, the central problem of low wages in the hospital sector has been 
addressed mainly through decentralization and liberalization of the system of 
management,   accountability and through expanding the autonomy given to the 
management of the hospital. The principal in all cases is the state (MH) or the 
municipality, which appoints the board of directors and approves the framework for 
employment and remuneration levels. Nominally, the board of directors has considerable 
discretion in regard to remuneration and investment decisions. The NFC requires that at 
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least 40 percent of insurance money should be distributed in the form of wages. Given the 
shortage of funds however, managerial autonomy is fairly limited. The management has 
the freedom either to distribute most of the subsidy and NHIF reimbursement as 
remuneration at the expense of maintenance and medicine expenditures,  to accumulate 
arrears to suppliers or to shift part of the burden to their customers by extracting cash 
payments for medicines and services, etc. In fact, all these phenomena shape the reality 
of the hospital care in Bulgaria.  
Despite its advantages in terms of simplicity, and accountability, the shift to hard 
budget constraints generates some new risks to the system. First, even though nominally 
it is insurance-based financing the NHIF disbursement ceilings build into the system 
strong elements of central budget allocation. The NHIF allocates the insurance money 
rather than the MH allocating the funds from the general revenues. The hospital does not 
have incentives to provide more services than contracted with the NHIF as it may not be 
paid for them. Second, the system does not contain good drivers for finding the optimal 
balance between spending on wages, medicines and materials in each CP cost structure. 
Without regulation about the minimum expenses for medicine that goes for each CP 
claim to the NHIF, this system is prone to abuse as the hospital management may allocate 
all receipts from the NHIF to salaries, while making the patients pay for the medicines 
that are calculated in the cost of the medical path. Furthermore, the system does not 
provide incentives to invest in equipment, as the NHIF allocation would not necessarily 
be revised accordingly. Other things equal, new technologies raise current costs for 
consumables, maintenance services and training, which may not be accordingly reflected 
in the NHIF financing and come at the expense of wages.  
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The road ahead 
The overview of the restructuring of the healthcare sector in Bulgaria shows that 
the shift to insurance-based financing is more or less completed. Many persisting 
problems however, indicate that the reform has not yet delivered optimal solutions. There 
are several pressing challenges that need to be addressed in the short run. 
Firstly, there is unfinished agenda in the restructuring of the outpatient service 
sector. It concerns above all the problems of access and coverage as well as the optimal 
balance between per-capita and activity based financing. More money needs to be 
allocated to prevention and prophylactics in order to reduce the risks and the burden of 
the health insurance and inpatient service sectors. The clue is in increasing the coverage 
and access to primary and especially specialized health care services to cover better 
social groups at risk. Financial incentives designed to attract medical staff to these groups 
and remote and rural areas need to be increased and better targeted. The efficiency and 
outreach of the various national health programs is also to be reconsidered through cost-
benefit analysis.  
Secondly, large part of the problems of health service provision stems from the 
incomplete coverage of the insurance system. It leaves those groups, that are most 
exposed to health risks outside the scope of the system. The state needs to find a solution 
for those that have lost insurance rights and to optimize payroll tax collection policies 
rather than to punish those who have little responsibility for irregular contributions by 
their employers.  
Thirdly, public policy and regulation in the field of medicine supply and 
procurement needs to go through major reassessment and restructuring. Guarantees are 
needed that hospitals spend the appropriate amount for medicines for each of the CP 
contracted with the NHIF, so that medicine costs do not fall on the insured persons. The 
list of medicines for outpatient use reimbursed by the NHIF should be negotiated 
including quantities and prices in most transparent way. A more activist price monitoring 
and control on this oligopoly market could be considered.  
Fourthly, the most pressing problems of healthcare stem from the impasse in the 
hospital care sector. Hospital financing is still far from optimal, with NHIF refunds 
reflecting supply potential rather than actual demand and cost of services. This calls for 
reconsideration of the financial relations between hospitals and the NHIF. 
Last but not least, the role of the private sector and the nature of private-public 
interface in the healthcare sector need to be reconsidered. The private sector is still kept 
away from this market of health services. 
The last two points are the core of the stalling reform in the sector in the short run 
and correspondingly are given more attention in the following three paragraphs. 
Clinical pathways vs. diagnostically related groups 
From the outset the introduction of the clinical pathways was seen as a stepping 
stone into the internationally accepted system of diagnostically related groups (DRGs). 
They form the core of the so called case-mix approach in the prospective financing of 
hospital services. These are diagnoses and procedures which can be grouped together 
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based on proximity of inputs and cost for the purpose of hospital contracts with health 
insurance funds.8 
DRGs are believed to be superior mechanism to CP for several reasons. It is a 
methodology of putting into standard framework the value of the output of the hospital 
with a breakdown of the cost of the various inputs. To make the system operational all 
procedures and activities are classified into groups of similar costs. All expenses are 
recorded and codified according to this classification. As all hospitals use the same codes 
for defining and measuring their output, this allows better measuring of the share of the 
separate hospital units in the prospective medical service provided, and hence - more 
equitable distribution of health insurance funds. Thus, they are more flexible instrument 
for valuating and reimbursing the actual costs of the services provided. As already 
mentioned, departure from the initially assigned CP may be costly and cause losses. 
Actual treatment often deviates from the initially assigned clinical path, which may lead 
to substantial differences between CP and actual treatment, i.e. between actual spending 
and reimbursement. This creates perverse incentives for doctors to accept patients under 
the most expensive clinical path in order to make sure that they would not be at a loss. 
The DRGs allow more precise accounting and databases of hospital care and costs on one 
hand and more financial flexibility in the course of the treatment. Thus they are believed 
to narrow the gap between NHIF financing and actual hospital costs. Furthermore, the CP 
contracts reflect the assessed capacity of the hospital to provide services rather than the 
actual customer’s demand for services. It is more a supply-led instrument of healthcare 
financing relative to the DRG, which allow an allocation of resources closer to actual 
demand for services. In other words they are believed to shift the system from input-
based financing to output-based financing. 
The appraisal and preparation work on the introduction of DRGs in Bulgaria dates 
back to 1993, i.e. 7 years before the launch of the health insurance system. A number of 
projects financed by USAID, the World Bank and the PHARE program provided the 
technical and expert work needed for their introduction.9 Among the major outputs in the 
subsequent 12 years of intensive consultancy work are the translation of the International 
Classification of Diseases, the testing of the codification and accounting reporting 
software in an ever growing number of pilot hospitals, drafting of detailed strategies, road 
maps and action plans for the introduction of the DRGs and training of trainers and of 
accountants and hospital managers etc. etc. The latter is quite understandable as for the12 
years of training a large number of the trainees may have been retiring without having the 
chance to see the system operating. Most of the work has been done with the consultancy 
assistance of 3M of Switzerland. 10 years after its first contract in Bulgaria 3M reported 
640 581 patients’ records in 40 pilot hospitals and training of 1585 trainers and submitted 
an updated roadmap for the introduction of DRGs in 2005-2006. According to that 
program, in 2005 all hospitals should have been covered by the DRG database reporting 
and accounting system and the financing itself should be introduced on a pilot basis, 
                                                 
8 The idea of DRGs originated in Yale University in the late 1960s after being successfully introduced in 
New Jersey in the 1970s, in 1983 becomes universal in the US. This first version has 24 main diagnostic 
categories comprising 470 DRGs. Today depending on the grouper software the number of groups ranges 
from 470 to 1500. 
9 The first USAID project dates back to 1994 and involved two consultancy companies 3M and AVT 
Consulting. 
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while in 2006 all hospitals were expected to shift to DRG-based financing. After  much 
donor and technical assistance money has been spent on preparation of the introduction 
of the DRG approach, the new health strategy published in 2006 however, still does not 
contain clear roadmap to the transition of this more precise and flexible form of insurance 
financing.  
Equity, consumer choice and competition 
Reforms so far have been centered on exclusive and universal state insurance. 
Little is done to complement the system of compulsory health insurance with private 
insurance, to allow consumers to take their health in their own hands. The state is to take 
responsibility mostly for those in need, i.e. it needs to ensure basic healthcare standards. 
Better services are usually ensured through private insurance according to the customers’ 
ability to pay. This will increase consumer choice and allow hospitals to compete and 
attract patients. The responsibility of the state is to encourage private health insurance 
through adequate incentives and most favorable business environment. Currently there 
are limited incentives for voluntary health insurance, and the buying a private plan does 
not reduce substantially other tax liabilities, or health insurance contributions. Rather 
than raising the rate of compulsory contributions the state may find it more efficient to 
provide incentives to employers and employed and self employed to compliment NHIF 
insurance with other private insurance. This would be a good move towards better 
private-public partnership in healthcare reform. The state’s responsibility in such a health 
system includes as well oversight on the insurance and health service market so that 
consumers’ rights are adequately protected. 
A wider consumer choice of quality of services should be entrusted to the market 
rather than to the regulations as is the case now. Hospitals’ income should depend on 
their ability to attract patients through latest technology and good specialists rather than 
on their contract with the sole state insurer. This implies different management skills by 
the health service providers, including investment project appraisal and management and 
new attitude to clients, including clearly set price policy. Those hospitals where expenses 
are higher because of better equipment or highly-paid specialists should make it clear to 
the consumer what part of the expenses is borne by him and what part is reimbursed by 
the NHIF. This will encourage as well the purchase of additional pre-paid health plans.  
This implies as well new management that attaches higher priority to the patient 
rather than the NHIF. Of course if a hospital is rational business agent, the only definition 
of a client that makes sense is related to the source of money, i.e. the client is who pays, 
or on whose choice the amount of receipts depends. In the case of the Bulgarian 
healthcare system the latter still depends to a larger extent on the National framework 
contract, i.e. on union negotiations with the NHIF, rather than on customer choice. In 
brief, the state in the face of the NHIF is still more important client for the hospitals in 
Bulgaria than the patients that pay for their insurance. 
It is worth noting however that the capacity of the market should not be 
overestimated. The above-mentioned project-management and customer-satisfaction 
skills are in shortage in present day public hospital sector after long years of budget 
financing. Moreover , this is not a market where one can rely much on competition 
between service providers especially out of the university and city centers. Therefore the 
concept of consumer choice may have more relevance for these medical centers rather 
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than for most of the territory of the country, where customers have limited access to only 
one hospital or diagnostic center. Most hospitals due to their specialization or location 
operate in monopolistic or oligopolistic position on the market and may abuse the 
opportunity to complement NHIF financing with price list for the various services. This is 
a market of services, which means that the wage component has large weight in the end-
user price, which may exceed 50-60 per cent. Given the lack of competition, price 
differences may reflect higher wages, which in turn may not always reflect higher 
qualifications and skills, or the use of new technologies, but rather lower demand 
elasticities of healthcare services. In brief, doctors may just cash out on the lack of 
consumer choice. But if they do it anyway under the table, a price list for all services is 
much better and efficient instrument to optimize costs than the current system of 
widespread informal payments for hospital services.  
Advanced health systems try to find the optimal balance between market choice 
and incentives on the one hand and the responsibilities of the state, on the other. Usually 
the state takes primary responsibility for improved coverage and access for the groups 
that are most exposed to health risks. Second it manages the pursuit of national health 
priorities, such as active prevention, immunization and prophylactic policies,,the outcome 
of which are monitored through the standard indicators. The objectives of wider 
consumer choice are entrusted to the private sector. In the context of Bulgaria this would 
imply more active involvement of the private sector in the provision of inpatient services 
and individual or collective pre-paid plans. The state has regulatory and control 
responsibilities on both the insurance and the health service markets, but the current 
balance between incentives on one hand and controls and sanctions on the other needs to 
be redressed in favor of better-targeted incentives.  
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Bulgaria’s basic demographic indicators in regional comparison 1994-2004 
 
 Growth rate Aged 60+  (%) Total fertility rate Longevity 
 1994-2004 1994 2004 1994 2004 2004 
0-5 death 
rate 
Austria 0.2 19.7 22.3 1.4 1.4 79 5 
Belgium 0.3 21.2 22.2 1.6 1.7 78 5 
Denmark 0.4 20.0 20.7 1.8 1.8 78 5 
Finland 0.3 18.8 20.9 1.8 1.7 79 4 
France 0.4 20.3 20.9 1.7 1.9 80 5 
Germany 0.2 20.6 24.8 1.3 1.3 79 5 
Greece 0.5 21.1 22.9 1.3 1.2 79 5 
Ireland 1.3 15.2 15.0 1.9 1.9 78 6 
Italy 0.1 22.1 25.3 1.2 1.3 81 5 
Luxembourg 1.4 18.3 18.3 1.7 1.7 79 6 
Netherlands 0.5 17.7 18.9 1.6 1.7 79 5 
Portugal 0.4 20.1 22.1 1.5 1.5 78 5 
Spain 0.7 20.5 21.3 1.2 1.3 80 5 
Sweden 0.2 22.1 23.0 1.9 1.7 81 4 
United Kingdom 0.3 20.9 21.0 1.8 1.7 79 6 
Cyprus 1.4 14.7 16.5 2.2 1.6 79 5 
Czech Republic -0.1 18.0 19.6 1.5 1.2 76 5 
Estonia -1.0 18.9 21.5 1.5 1.4 72 8 
Hungary -0.2 19.3 20.5 1.6 1.3 73 8 
Latvia -0.9 19.0 22.3 1.5 1.3 71 11 
Lithuania -0.6 17.3 20.5 1.7 1.3 72 10 
Malta 0.7 15.7 18.3 2.0 1.5 79 6 
Poland 0.0 15.6 16.7 1.8 1.2 75 8 
Slovakia 0.1 15.1 16.0 1.7 1.2 74 8 
Slovenia 0.0 17.6 20.2 1.3 1.2 77 4 
Bulgaria -0.7 21.0 22.3 1.4 1.2 72 15 
Romania -0.5 17.1 19.2 1.4 1.3 72 20 
Albania -0.2 8.9 11.8 2.7 2.2 72 19 
Bosnia&Herzegovina 1.0 11.8 18.9 1.5 1.3 73 15 
Croatia -0.3 19.2 21.9 1.5 1.3 75 7 
FYR Macedonia 0.0 16.8 18.4 1.9 1.6 73 14 
Serbia & Montenegro 0.4 13.0 15.3 1.9 1.5 72 15 
Source: World health report 2006 
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